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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
W7.\ 




WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS, 
INC., and SEVIER COUNTY 
TREASURER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Civil No. 86-8-9837 
VS. 
RULON LIND and FLORA S. LIND, 
his wife, Trustor; CORPORATION 
OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS,Beneficiary; 
and SEVIER COUNTY TREASURER, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 10128 
vs. 
LAYGO COMPANY, a partnership, 
CHRISTIE RICHARDS, JANICE 
PARKER, LEANE JARRETTE, and 
JEAN YOUNG, 




J. D. SPRINGER, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 10131 
Pursuant to the stipulation of all counsel the above-
referenced matters came before the Court, sitting without a jury, 
beginning Thursday, March 9, 1989, and continuing through Monday, 
March 13. 
The four cases were informally consolidated for hearing 
on motions filed by each of the Defendants requesting the Court 
to fix a valuation date other than the date of service of 
summons. Further, the petitions requested the Court to require 
payment of interest from the valuation date fixed by the Court 
rather than the date the Orders of Immediate Occupancy were 
entered. 
The Court has carefully considered the evidence adduced 
during the three days of hearings and has further considered the 
extensive memoranda filed and the cases cited therein, including 
particularly the Utah cases which have dealt with the valuation 
date as well as payment of interest. 
In order to properly treat the Defendants1 motions the 
Court is called upon to make factual findings, legal rulings and 
to resolve several mixed questions of law and fact. No effort 
has been made to compartmentalize these. 
With the foregoing introduction the Court finds and 
3 
concludes as follows, to-wit: 
1. The Court concludes that the constitutional 
requirement of "just compensation" set forth in Article I, §22 of 
the Utah Constitution takes precedence over §78-34-9 & 11, and 
that the latter cannot be strictly applied if such application 
would undermine the constitutional requirement. 
2. The Court concludes that §78-34-11 creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the date for determining valuation in 
eminent domain cases is the date of service of process. In 
reaching this conclusion the Court has relied upon and is in 
agreement with the opinion of Justice Stewart in Utah State Road 
Com'n vs. Fribercr, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984). 
3. After carefully considering all of the evidence 
adduced the Court finds and concludes that if the trier of fact 
were required to value Defendants1 properties as of the date of 
service of summons it would not lead to an award of "just 
compensation" as required by the constitution. 
4. The Court concludes that June 22, 1977, should be 
the date of valuation in these cases. This is the date when the 
Environmental Impact Statement was officially approved by federal 
authorities and the general corridor west of Richfield and 
through these Defendants' properties was finally selected. 
5. The Court finds that there is a close relationship 
between the date the corridor was officially selected on June 22, 
1977, and the time frame in which these Defendants' properties 
could reasonably have expected to have developed or to have been 
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sold for potential development purposes absent the impact of the 
interstate. 
6. Based on the Court's careful reading of the 
Friberq decision and its consideration of precedents in other 
jurisdictions, and after carefully evaluating all of the evidence 
introduced, the Court determines that June 22, 1977 is the date 
which is most likely to insure fundamental fairness in keeping 
with the constitutional mandate of just compensation. 
7. Defendants own property within the corridor of 
Interstate Highway 70, and were served with summons in eminent 
domain proceedings on or about the following dates: 
a. Laygo - October 15, 1987. 
b. Lind - October 12, 1987. 
c. Ogden - August 19, 1986. 
d. Springer - October 7, 1987. 
8. Orders of Immediate Occupancy were entered under 
the following dates: 
a. Laygo - October 28, 1987 
b. Lind - October 28, 1987 
c. Ogden - September 10, 1986 
d. Springer - October 28, 1987 
9. Interstate Highway 70 runs from Washington, D.C. 
on the east to its merger with Interstate Highway 15 near Cove 
Fort, and thence to Los Angeles. With the exception noted below 
the final segment of some three thousand miles of this interstate 
is being constructed immediately west of Richfield City, Sevier 
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County, Utah, where Defendant's property is located. 
10. Additional lanes are being completed in a remote 
stretch between Fremont Junction in Emery County and Green River, 
Utah, though the corridor was acquired and the Interstate has 
been opened in that area for many years. 
11. There is evidence indicating that this last 
construction west of Richfield was a result of the desire of 
Richfield City so that the businessmen could get the advantage of 
the business going through the City. However, it was not at the 
request of these property owners and the effects upon these 
property owners and the businessmen are entirely different. 
12. As a prerequisite to entry of the orders of 
immediate occupancy the Plaintiff tendered into court its 
appraised values of the properties being taken. Shortly 
thereafter these deposited funds were withdrawn by the respective 
Defendants. 
13. The Defendants do not challenge the right or the 
necessity of the taking and have raised no defenses relating 
thereto. Rather Defendants challenge the adequacy of the 
compensation which the Plaintiff has tendered. 
14. The Court holds that Defendants' withdrawal of the 
funds deposited by the Plaintiff did not constitute a waiver or 
abandonment of their right to question the appropriate date of 
valuation. The Court is of the opinion that the valuation date 
is a matter relating to compensation and not a defense to the 
taking. Accordingly the Court determines that §78-34-9 as it 
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relates to waiver of defense has no application. 
15. Construction of the interstate through Sevier 
Valley was first locally announced in the Richfield Reaper 
Newspaper on October 24, 1957. Between that date and the fall of 
1987 there have been some 92 articles in the Richfield Reaper 
regarding the interstate. 
16. The Court has considered the newspaper articles 
not for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather as evidence 
of what information was publicized in the local area. 
17. The Court takes judicial notice that the Richfield 
Reaper is a weekly newspaper published in Richfield, Sevier 
County, State of Utah, and has wide circulation in Sevier Valley. 
The evidence indicated that the local weekly circulation was 
approximately 3,000 copies. 
18. Over the course of years following initial 
announcement of the interstate project the Richfield Reaper 
publicized projected completion dates for the interstate highway 
through Sevier Valley including the area where the properties of 
the Defendants herein are located. The Reaper attributed these 
projected completion dates to UDOT Officials. The projections 
were inconsistent. They are as follows: 
a. Richfield Reaper, July 29, 1965: Projected 
completion date was 1972. 
b. Richfield Reaper, October 13, 1966: 
Projected completion date was 1970. 
c. Richfield Reaper, December 1, 1977: 
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Projected completion date was 10 years away (presumably 1987). 
d. Richfield Reaper, November 23, 1978: 
Projected completion was moved up to 1979-80. 
19. None of the projected completion dates has proved 
accurate, and completion of the project will carry into the 
1990s, well over 30 years from the date of its first 
announcement. 
20. Plaintiff considered three different alignments 
through Sevier Valley, one on the east side, one in the center 
and one on the west. The latter skirts the west side of 
Richfield City and is hereafter referred to as the "west 
alignment." It is located in a confined area between the west 
hills and Richfield's northwest residential sector. Plaintiff 
was required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before 
the route could be selected. 
21. On the 18th day of March, 1977, the Environmental 
Impact Statement was completed, and the west Richfield alignment 
was officially approved by the Utah State Road Commission. It 
was thereafter officially approved by the Federal Highway 
Administration on June 22, 1977. 
22. Selection of the west alignment along the west 
side of Richfield and through the property of these Defendants 
received wide local publicity with front-page newspaper articles 
in the following editions of the Richfield Reaper: December 2, 
1976, March 17, 1977, March 24, 1977. 
23. By the time of its official selection, the 
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location of the corridor was already generally known. Shortly 
before the actual interstate alignment was finalized Richfield 
City reacted to the anticipated selection of the west alignment 
and the likely corridor location was published as part of the 
City's official zoning map in the May 20, 1976 edition of the 
Richfield Reaper. A similar map reflecting the proposed west 
alignment had been published on the front page of the Reaper as 
early as September 7, 1972. The zone map follows: 
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24. Richfield City has had a policy of declining to 
approve any development within the proposed interstate corridor 
as is evidenced by the following testimony given by City Manager 
Woody Farnsworth in UDOT vs. Partington, Sevier Civil No. 10129. 
The following testimony was received in evidence pursuant to 
stipulation, but with the proviso that the City is an independent 
political body from the State and is not controlled thereby: 
Q. Thank you very much. During your years of 
experience with the city, dating back into 
the 1970s with the City Council and the 
Planning Commission, has the city had a 
general policy toward the interstate highway? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. What has that policy been? 
A. Generally, it consisted with not approving 
or allowing development around the freeway or 
freeway land. [Farnsworth transcript p.19.] 
25. The Plaintiff has encouraged the City's policy of 
declining to approve development in the proposed interstate 
corridor. 
26. Richfield City experienced dramatic growth in 
residential construction beginning in the early 1970s and 
continuing through the decade. Beginning in the year 1981 there 
was a dramatic decline in residential construction. 
27. The fair market value of ground in or adjacent to 
Richfield City being suitable for residential development was 
substantially higher in 1977 and 1978 than it was in 1986 or 
1987. This finding applies to land adjacent to the developed 
portion of Richfield1s northwest quadrant where Defendants1 
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properties are located. 
28. In arriving at the foregoing determination the 
Court relies not only on comparable sales, but the following 
factors relevant to an income capitalization approach to 
appraising: (1) The decline in building permits in Richfield 
City evidencing reduction in the need for building lots. (2) The 
increased cost of subdivision improvements. (3J The increase in 
the cost of financing to a would-be developer. (4) The Court's 
own knowledge, judicially taken, of the economic down-turn in the 
Richfield area and in the Sevier County area, and in fact in the 
entire US 89 area all the way to the Arizona border. During 
recent years there has been reduced activity in land development 
and home construction and a general decline in fair market value 
of land in general. The evidence supported these facts of which 
the Court was already aware. 
29. During the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s, the 
overwhelming amount of residential growth in Richfield was to the 
northwest toward Defendants1 properties. 
30. The residential growth toward the northwest and 
toward Defendants1 properties continued until the 1977-1978 time 
frame when there was a dramatic shift elsewhere, principally 
toward the southwest, with a lesser amount of development in the 
northeast. The Court finds this was caused by the interstate 
designation. 
31. Beginning in 1950 and continuing through mid 1977 
approximately 90% of the subdivisions newly approved or where 
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substantial development occurred was located in the extreme 
northwest portion of Richfield City adjacent to or approaching 
the property of these Defendants. 
32. Subsequent to mid 1977 only some approximately 10% 
of the subdivisions newly approved or in which substantial 
development occurred were located in the northwest portion of 
Richfield City. 
33. The shift from the northwest portion of the 
community to other areas occurred when the natural growth trends 
reached close proximity to the interstate corridor, the location 
of which was widely known. 
34. The impending construction of the interstate 
altered long established growth patterns and precluded 
residential development from moving on to the lands of these 
Defendants. 
35. The Court finds that in the absence of the 
interstate the subject properties had residential potential with 
varying degrees of ripeness. This finding is only for the 
purpose of ruling on the pending motions and each of the 
Defendants as well as the Plaintiff is entitled to present to a 
jury his/her or its theory of the highest and best use to which 
the various properties could have been put absent the influence 
of the interstate. 
36. Portions of the properties of the Defendants have 
reasonable access to all utilities, including water, sewer, 
electricity and telephone. They are reasonably proximate to 
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attractive neighborhoods in the highest area of residential zone 
classification in Richfield City and in that sector of the 
community wherein most of the public parks, schools, churches and 
athletic fields exist. Further the subject properties are toward 
higher elevations which have been attractive to home builders in 
communities throughout Utah. 
37. Stoppage of the northwest residential growth 
pattern is related to the anticipated location of the interstate 
and not to the canal located in that area. The canal could be 
breached and had been breached before whenever desired by the 
City. Specifically, high quality residential development had 
spawned above the canal in close proximity to the property of 
these Defendants and outside of the designated interstate 
corridor. 
38. In the absence of the Interstate highway, there 
are no legal obstacles to the annexation to Richfield City and/or 
zone changes on any of Defendants1 properties. 
39. Each of the Defendants has performed overt acts 
indicating a design to use their properties for residential 
purposes. 
40. It would have served no useful purpose for these 
Defendants to have undertaken to further plat or develop their 
properties when they had full knowledge the properties would be 
taken for the interstate highway and when Richfield City had a 
policy against any development within the contemplated corridor. 
Equity does not require the performance of useless acts. 
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41. Subsequent to the corridor selection on June 22, 
1977 there were modest shifts of the actual right-of-way lines 
and there was also a repositioning of the interchanges on both 
the north and south ends of Richfield. The west Richfield 
alignment however remained firmly designated from the time of its 
official selection until commencement of condemnation proceedings 
against these Defendants some 10 years later and some 30 years 
after the initial announcement of the freeway project. 
42. The right-of-way and interchange shifting, as well 
as the failure to finalize the design, did not reduce, but rather 
augmented the injury to the Defendant landowners, and extended 
the period of uncertainty during which their ability to exercise 
the incidents of property ownership was severely limited. 
43. The Court does not rely on a concept of fault or 
blame, but finds that there was "undue protraction . . . of the 
condemnation process" within the meaning of the Friberg decision 
(at 830). For whatever reason it has taken the Plaintiff over 
thirty years to complete the project, the protraction has worked 
to the significant injury of the Defendant landowners. The Court 
sees no distinction between "undue protraction" after the filing 
of suit, as in Friberg, and "undue protraction" before the filing 
of suit. The matter of ultimate consequence is the undermining 
of each Defendant landowner's constitutional right to receive 
just compensation. 
44. The interstate highway created a condition 
precluding the development of Defendants1 properties or the sale 
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thereof for immediate or future development. 
45. As a practical matter these Defendants could not 
have developed their property nor sold it a fair price for the 
purpose of development. They were obliged to just hold their 
properties and pay the taxes on them until condemnation occurred. 
46. Because condemnation has occurred, the Defendants 
have lost the opportunity to retain their lands until market 
conditions improve. 
47. Even under Plaintiff's view of the evidence there 
has been a marked decline in the market value of potential 
subdivision land within or in reasonable proximity to Richfield 
City. Under Plaintiff's view of the evidence, market value 
peaked sometime in between 1977 and 1986-87 when these 
condemnation actions were commenced. Plaintiff claimed the value 
peaked during or about 1980 and that the 1977 and 1986-87 values 
are comparable. Plaintiff claims thereby a failure to meet the 
requirement of the Friberg decision which refers to a 
"substantial difference" in value between the date of service of 
summons and the date of valuation being considered. 
48. The Court does not accept Plaintiff's view of the 
evidence, having determined that market value would have been 
substantially higher in 1977 than in 1986-87. More importantly, 
the facts as advanced by Plaintiff, even if true, would not cure 
the injustice to these Defendants. Under such a situation they 
would be chained to their land while the market went up and then 
back down. Both sides concur that the market is now down. 
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49. The Defendants have met the burden of overcoming 
the statutory presumption that the valuation date be fixed on the 
date summons is served. This date would not lead to just 
compensation. 
50. The Court further determines that the Defendants 
are entitled to recover interest at the statutory rate of 8% from 
and after the date fixed for valuation. At all times from June 
22, 1977, forward each of the Defendants was effectively 
precluded from exercising important incidents of ownership over 
their lands and were obliged to abandon all but the most nominal 
kind of use. None of the Defendants received any return on their 
property between June 22, 1977 and the date of institution of the 
condemnation actions. A likely exception exists with respect to 
the Lind home. While its marketability would have been severely 
limited there may have been usage value to its owner. The Court 
reserves jurisdiction regarding the application of interest vis-
a-vis the rental value thereof. 
51. In determining to impose interest the Court has 
considered the statute which provides for interest only from the 
date of service of summons, or from the date of actual occupancy 
(§78-34-9). While this statute may be constitutionally sound in 
the overwhelming number of cases, its application under the facts 
of these cases would deprive these Defendants of just 
compensation, and therefore would be in violation of the 
constitutional requirement. In this connection the Court notes 
the Friberg language to the effect that "just compensation means 
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that the owners must be put in as good a position money wise as 
they would have occupied had their property not been taken." 
Further, the Court is aware of decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court which predate the Fribera decision and which have strictly 
applied §78-34-9 regarding the payment of interest. Specifically 
the Court has considered City of South Oaden vs. Fuiiki, 621 P.2d 
1254 (Utah 1980) and State vs. Peek, 1 U.2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 
(Utah 1953). While Fuj iki was cited in Friberg, the interest 
issue was not faced since the valuation date was moved forward. 
The Court is of the opinion that these cases have not fully come 
to grips with the constitutional requirement of just compensation 
and also with the constitutional concept enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in United States vs. Causby. 328 U.S. 
256 at 261. In that case the Court stated: 
It is the owner's loss, not the takerfs gain 
which is the measure of the value of the 
property taken. 
52. As heretofore noted, Plaintiff claims a 
substantially similar market value in 1977 and 1986-87, but 
claims a substantially higher market value during the interim. 
If the Court were to accept this evidence as a basis for 
declining to change the valuation date, or for declining to 
require payment of interest, then Defendants would be put in the 
untenable position of having their land held hostage for 10 years 
while the market went up an down without a reasonable opportunity 
to sell at fair value and without any return on the property 
during the interim. To award Defendants the same compensation 10 
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years later without interest would not be just. As noted by the 
Friberg court: 
The constitutional requirement of just 
compensation derives "as much content from 
the basic equitable principles of fairness as 
it does from technical concepts of property 
law . . . [at 828] [Emphasis added] 
DATED this /b ^ day of «y|gh, 1989. 
W v \ y DON V.--TIBBS 
DISTRICT COURTS'JUDGE 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING -> 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS was placed in 
the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepaid on the -3 ^  ^^day of March, 1989, 
addressed as follows: 
Mr. Stephen C. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Mr. Alan S. Bachman 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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